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without having obtained a permit as is herein required, or without complying
with the provisions of this chapter, or in violation of or variance from the
terms of any such permit. The provisions of this chapter shall apply to and be
binding upon all property owners, developers, agents, contractors or employees
engaged in activities regulated by this chapter. (Ord. 1-2-96, 1-18-1996).
St. George City Code § 7-2-7: Protective Measures

20

A. Barriers, Warning Devices: It shall be the duty of every person cutting or
making an excavation in or upon any public place, to place and maintain
barriers and warning devices necessary for safety of the general public.
B. Conformance; Warning Lights: Barriers, warning signs, lights, etc., shall
conform to the requirements of the manual on uniform traffic control devices
(MUTCD) and the public works encroachment officer. Warning lights shall
meet MUTCD standards to indicate a hazard to traffic from sunset of each day
to sunrise of the next day.
C. Emission Of Light: Electrical markers or flashers shall emit light at
sufficient intensity and frequency to be visible at a reasonable distance for
safety. Reflectors and reflecting materials shall be used to supplement, but not
replace, light sources.
D. Traffic: The permittee shall take appropriate measures to assure that during
the performance of the excavation work, traffic conditions as near normal as
possible shall be maintained at all times so as to minimize inconvenience to the
occupants of the adjoining property and to the general public. When traffic
conditions permit, the public works encroachment officer may by written
approval, permit closing of streets and alleys to all traffic for a period of time
prescribed by him, if in his opinion it is necessary. Such written approval may
require that the permittee give notification to various public agencies and to
the general public. In such cases, such written approval shall not be valid until
such notice is given.
E. Advance Warning: Warning signs shall meet MUTCD standards and be
v
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placed far enough in advance of the construction operation to alert traffic
within a public street, and cones or other approved devices shall be placed to
channel traffic, in accordance with the instructions of the public works
encroachment officer. (Ord. 79-5-4,5-3-1979, eff. 7-1-1979; amd. 2003 Code)
St. George City Code § 7-2-8: Restoration of Surface

20

Any person, firm or corporation making any excavation or tunnel in or under
any public street, alley or other public place in the city where no pavement
exists, shall immediately upon completion of the project restore the surface to
its original condition. Additionally, any opening in a paved or improved
portion of a street shall immediately, upon completion of the project, be
repaired and the surface relaid by the applicant. All work site restoration as
required by this section shall comply with all ordinances of the city, the city
standard specifications for design and construction, any requirements set forth
by the public works encroachment officer in issuance of the permit, and under
supervision of the director of public works, and shall include, but not be
limited to, repair, cleanup, backfilling, compaction and stabilization, paving
and other work necessary to place the site in an acceptable condition following
the conclusion of the work or the expiration or revocation of the permit. (Ord.
1-2-96, 1-18-1996; amd. 2003 Code).
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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (as amended 2001).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The proper issue before this Court is much broader than that stated by Appellant:
ISSUE #1:
The first issue is whether the District Court properly granted summary judgment based
upon its finding that Plaintiff/Appellant, Jule Kreyling, failed to establish that any duty of
care was breached by the City of St. George and further, whether the District Court was
correct in its analysis that summary judgment was proper because reasonable minds could
not differ in the conclusion that the evidence adduced by Kreyling was simply insufficient
to sustain his legal claim. See Rose v. Provo City, 61 P.3d 1017, 1020 (Utah Ct. App. 2003)
(quoting Lamarr v. UDOT, 828 P.2d 535, 538 (Utah Ct App. 1992) andFerre v. State, 784
P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989)). There is simply no issue for trial unless there is sufficient
evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a favorable verdict. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242,249 (1986). If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not
significantly probative, summaryjudgment is appropriate. Id. at 250, see also AMSSaltlnd.,
Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of America, 942 P.2d 315, 320 (Utahl997). Such conclusions are
reviewed for correctness. Wheeler v. McPherson, 40 P.3d 632, 635 (Utah 2002) (citations
omitted); R. 655, Transcript of Hearing, Appellee's Addendum "A" at pg. 23; R.615, Order
Granting Summary Judgment at pg. 2, Appellee's Addendum "B."
ISSUE #2:
The second issue is whether the District Court properly granted summaryjudgment
1

4233 003

based upon its finding that the Plaintiff presented no probative evidence that St. George City
had created or had actual or constructive notice of a defect in the park strip. See Fishbaugh
v. Utah Power & Light, 969?.2d 403 (Utah 1998) (Plaintiff must present evidence of notice
and an opportunity to remedy a defect to survive summary judgment); Goebel v. Salt Lake
City Southern Railroad Co., 104 P.3d. 1185, 1194 (Utah 2004) (evidence of notice and a
reasonable time to remedy are required to survive summary judgment or directed verdict).
Such conclusions are reviewed for correctness. Id. R. 655, Transcript of Hearing, Appellee's
Addendum "A" at pg. 23; R.615, Order Granting Summary Judgment at pg. 2, Appellee's
Addendum "B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below-

Jule Kreyling, Plaintiff and Appellant herein (hereinafter referred to as "Kreyling"),
filed a Complaint on or about July 8, 2005, alleging he sustained personal injury when he
stepped into a hole located on the park strip when he went for lunch at the St. George Senior
Center. R.002. The property and the St. George Senior Center, owned and operated by
Washington County ("County"), abuts the St. George City ("City") property which includes
the sidewalk, park strip, gutter and road. Kreyling named the City, in his Complaint, as the
owner of the park strip where the hole was alleged to have been located, the County, as the
abutting landowner for both the old Senior Center and the new Center being constructed on
the neighboring lot, Watts Construction Company, Inc., the contractor employed by the
County to construct the new Senior Center on the adjoining lot, also abutting the sidewalk,
and DeMille Construction Company, the subcontractor who installed the water lines and
2
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removed any and all meter boxes. R.044, 027, 036, 264. Kreyling settled with Defendants
Washington County, Watts Construction and DeMille Construction. R.601, 605, 622, 625.
The City was dismissed on summary judgment. R. 615; Transcript of Summary Judgment
Hearing, attached hereto as Appellee's Addendum "A," and Order Granting the City's
Motion for Summary Judgment ("Order"), attached hereto as Appellee's Addendum "B."
Kreyling alleged in his Complaint that the City had created an artificial condition on the
premises and/or knew about a dangerous condition, or failed to discover the dangerous
condition through the exercise of reasonable care. R.004.
At summary judgment, Kreyling presented the same evidence and arguments to the
District Court that he now presents in his Brief. The District Court held:
The Court finds there is no probative evidence that the City of
St. George created the defect or condition in the park strip, or
knew or should have known of any defect or condition.
Therefore, the court hereby grants Defendant City's motion for
summary j udgment.
R. 616; Order, Appellee's Addendum "B."
B. Statement of Facts
L

Kreyling testified that he and his wife went for lunch at Washington County's

St. George Senior Center ("Center") "two, three, sometimes four times per week." R.476
(Kreyling Deposition at 20-21); See also Appellant's Addendum A.
2.

On the date of the incident, Kreyling parked his car along the curb near the

Center and next to a walkway that bridged the gutter and curb. R.476 (Id. at 18:19-25, 19:
3
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1-2,21:18-20). Plaintiff had parked in the same location dozens of times. R.481 (Id. at 39:4,*
47:5).
3.

There were one or two of these walkways bridging the gutter culverts and

Kreyling would always try to park near one, then walk around the vehicle to open his wife's
door. R.477,478,480 (Id, at 23:15-23,25:16-20,26:1-2,27:21,36:10; 39:23); Photographs
of driveway ramp, R342,345, 561; See also Photographs attached as Appellee's Addendum
"C."
4.

Kreyling believed these walkways were intended for the seniors to use when

going into the old Center, and had yellow lines marked for crossing the street, R.479
(Kreyling Deposition at 32:7-9, 20).
5.

According to Washington County Building Superintendent, Bob Coulter,

parking was available in the Center parking lot, but it was partially blocked for the
construction equipment at the building site. R514 (Coulter Deposition at 25). Parking
around the old Center was congested. R.526 (Id. at 73).
6.

Gerald Newton, who volunteers at the Center five days a week Monday

through Friday, including lunch time, testified that the Center patrons parked in the street
regardless of whether there was parking available in the parking lot. R.494 (Newton
Deposition at 20), R.479 (Kreyling Deposition at 33:14-16).
7.

Newton testified he considered the location where Kreyling parked to be

unsuitable for parking because of the construction, particularly in light of the fact that
alternative parking was available both in the Center parking lot and at the neighboring
church. R494-495 (Newton Deposition at 21-22).
4
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8.

Kreyling was aware of the parking lot, but preferred to park on the street

because it was "easier to get in and out." R. 477 (Kreyling Deposition at 22:17-25, 23:1-9,
132:12-19, and Addendum "A" to Appellant's Brief at 138-139).
9.

Sometime in September or early October, Kreyling and his wife went to the

Center for lunch, parking along the curb near the construction site for the new Senior Center.
R.481 (Kreyling Deposition at 22:24-25, 38:24-25, 23:1-9, 31-32, 39:1, 52:11-16, 57:24).
10.

Kreyling did not want his wife to walk on the dirt, but he parked in front of

the Center next to the construction site instead of in the parking lot because there was no
fence or cones around the construction. R.477,479,481 (Kreyling Deposition at 22,23,32,
41).
1L

Kreyling testified that he parked his vehicle parallel to the curb and roughly

even to a walkway and walked around the car to open the door for his wife; he stepped
backwards and into a hole in the park strip at the comer of the curbing and the ramp. R479
(Id. 31-32).
12.

Kreyling testified that when he had previously parked in this location, he had

never seen a hole, or any other obvious hazard. R.481 (Id. at 35:15-16 at 38:13-14, 39:8-9,
40:8-9,41:13-14).
13.

Kreyling testified that prior to his fall, he did not see a hole and distinctly

remembered "leaves and stuff," such as cobwebs, lying on the ground where he stepped in
ahole "up to his groin." R.317, 480-481 (Id. at 35:6-19, 52:11-16).
14.

On October 9, 2003, Kreyling signed an incident report indicating the fall

occurred on September 24 or 25,2003. R.330-333,485-486 (Id. at 57-58:23-11 and Exhibits
5
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"E" and "F" to MS J memorandum). On October 13, 2003, he signed another form, entitled
"Client's Report of Accident" citing the date of his fall as October 10,2003. R.317,330-331
(Deposition of Kreyling at 18:19-20, 52:14-17, 86:12-25).
15.

Kreyling testified that he and his son took photographs of the area

approximately two to three weeks after his fall, but also after the area had been fully
excavated. R.293, 301, 302, 304, 305, 505, 506, Addendum "A" Kreyling Deposition at
27:7,29:16-21,132:21-25,134:1-3,140:14-15. According to Curtis DeMille, the sidewalk,
curb and gutter were excavated on November 19, 2003. R.238 (DeMille Deposition,
certificate of corrections pg. 51).
16.

In preparation for the new Senior Center, and approximately a year before

construction began, Washington County purchased several homes at the site of the planned
"new" Center, removed the homes and leveled the site for construction. R.335,312-15,318
(Coulter Deposition at 26,32,37-39,56). Washington County prepared the site before Watts
Construction arrived to begin work. R.338 (Watts Deposition at 7:14-18).
17.

Before construction began, the area where the "hole" was located was a park

strip with lawn. R.328 (Newton Deposition 24); R.335, 343, 562-64 (Photographs of Preexisting Homes); see also Photographs at Appellee's Addendum "C."
18.

At one time there had been two driveways crossing the sidewalk and gutter and

entering the road from the homes removed by Washington County. R.317,521, 520 (Coulter
Deposition at 51, 56-7); Photographs of pre-existing homes, R. 343, 562-564 and
photographs at Appellee's Addendum "C."
19.

Washington County excavated and removed one of these driveways early on
6
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in its process of leveling and preparing the site for construction of the new Center. R.317,
520 (Coulter

Deposition at 57); Photograph R.561, and Photographs included with

Appellee's Addendum "C."
20.

It is the remaining driveway ramp Kreyling has identified as the "walkway" he

used when he and his wife went for lunch at the Center. R.292-93, 477-478 (Kreyling
Deposition at 25-27).
21.

The records indicate Watts Construction began its work at the site several

months prior to Kreyling's fall, in April or May 2003. R.322 (Coulter Deposition at 78).
22.

Washington County and/or Watts Construction and/or DeMille Construction

excavated the sidewalk where Plaintiff typically tried to park near the "walkway" or
driveway ramp. R.310, 513 (Coulter Deposition at 19).
23.

Mr. Coulter testified that the County's standard procedure during a construction

project is to fence the area as a safety precaution to prevent people from entering the
construction site. R.310, 513 (Coulter Deposition at 19); R.345-46, 561 (Photographs of
Construction Site).
24.

Representatives of Washington County and the Center do not recall whether

they ever erected a fence in the area of the accident and any fence that might have been
installed, would have been removed when the sidewalk, curb and gutter were excavated
because the construction company was "doing all of the dirt moving." R.310, 513 (Coulter
Deposition at 20-21); R.326, 493 (Newton Deposition at 15).
25.

Washington County employee Bob Coulter testified that at the time of this

incident, it was Washington County's practice to request an encroachment permit number
7
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from the City without completing an application and without saving documentation of the
encroachment permits. R.320 (Deposition of Bob Coulter at 63-65). However, in this case,
Washington County failed to request or obtain an encroachment permit or number to dig on
the City's property. R.320 (Coulter Deposition 62-65).
26.

Washington County removed the existing sewer, water lines, and gas lines

during site preparation. R.321 (Id. at 71:13-19).
27.

Defendant Curtis DeMille Construction was a subcontractor hired by Watts

Construction to install water lines to the new Senior Center and to excavate and remove the
curb, gutter and sidewalk and parkway. R.339, 551-52, 367-380 (Watts Deposition 12:2123); R. 354-55, 551-52 (DeMille Deposition at 7-8:23-2,21:17-23,22:12). DeMille began
its work in November 2003. R.238 (DeMille certificate of corrections, pg. 51).
28.

Curtis DeMille testified that prior to the excavation, he was required to submit

an application for an encroachment permit which included a "flagging plan" to demonstrate
where the contractor intended to put up warnings or barriers around the site. R358-59
(DeMille Deposition at 37:21-22, 38:2-11).
29.

Any meters in the park strip would have been removed, capped and the holes

filled by DeMille Construction. R. 356, 553 (Id. at 28:2-10, 29:11-14). However, Curtis
DeMille testified he did not recall removing anything from the site identified by Kreyling and
saw no "holes" in that area. R.354, 356, 550, 553. (Id. 26:5-7, 16-17:18-4).
30.

Any posts removed at the accident site were removed by Washington County.

R.360, 558 (Id. at 46:12-14).
31.

Bob Coulter testified that he knew the City had not removed a power pole from
8
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the area Kreyling states he fell; similarly Dennis Jorgensen, Power Systems Operations
Manager for the City, averred that the telephone pole currently installed at the location where
Kreyling indicates he fell has been in the same location since 1985 and no other power pole
has been moved or removed at that location. R.315, R.348-49. (Coulter Deposition at 40:2023); R.348-49 (Affidavit of Dennis Jorgensen at pg. 2).
32.

Curtis DeMille testified that DeMille Construction was contracted to excavate

on City property and to remove the park strip, as well as any and all meters located in that
area. R.548, 553 (DeMille Deposition at 7-8:23-2, 28:8-9). Bob Coulter testified a meter
would not be located where Kreyling indicated he fell. R.319,3 66 (Photograph with Kreyling
pointing), 521 (Coulter Deposition 60-61:24-3).
33.

Bob Coulter testified that he inspected the area where Kreyling fell and did not

see a definite hole, only a "dished out" area. R.511-512 (Id. at 11-12:12-9,13:15-20,14:1-8,
17:5-11).
34.

Gerald Newton, a volunteer at the Center testified that he had never seen a

"hole" in the park strip prior to Kreyling's fall. R.492 (Newton Deposition at 12-13:21-2).
Following Kreyling's fall, Newton looked at the area and found a hole that appeared to be
about nine inches deep near the curb. R.492 (Id, atlO-11:21-15, 13:8-9). There had been
some digging in the area, "they had done something to take the dirt out" R.494 (Id. at 18:921).
3 5.

According to the testimony of Curtis DeMille, there were no holes or anything

out of the ordinary between the curb and gutter and the sidewalk in the area identified by
Kreyling and no water or sewer line would cause the shape of the hole or impression
9
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Kreyling described. R. 354, 357, 550, 554 (DeMille Deposition at 16-17, 32:17-20).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Mr. Kreyling has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he fell
into a hole located in the park strip at the St. George Senior Center, owned and operated by
Washington County, that the City of St. George, as the property owner of the park strip,
created the hole, or knew or should have known that the hole or other dangerous defect
existed at that location and sufficient time had elapsed that the City should have addressed
the condition. However, all of the evidence available in this case confirms that the persons
who frequented the Center, including employees of Washington County, volunteers at the
Center, the contractor for the County construction project, Watts Construction and his
subcontractor, DeMille Construction, saw no "hole" in the location identified by Kreyling
either before or following his fall. Kreyling himself testified that he parked in the same
location "dozens" of times prior to his fall and never saw a hole in the park strip. Further,
Washington County and Watts Construction confirm that they did not obtain the required
encroachment permits, or otherwise notify the City of their intention to dig in the park strip
or excavate on City property. There is simply no evidence that the City was aware of any
holes or defects in the park strip, or that the City was notified by the County of its excavation
in the park strip to remove one of the driveways. The evidence also establishes that the
County utilized the property for law enforcement exercises, erecting barricades at the site just
about a year before the incident at issue in this case. Appellee's Addendum "C," photographs
showing pre-existing home and law enforcement officers. A summary judgment movant must
show, by reference to "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
10
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on file, together with the affidavits, if any" that there is no genuine issue of material fact.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56( c). "Once the movant has made this showing, the burden then shifts to
the nonmoving party, who may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings,
but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Orvis v.
Johnson, 111 P.3d 600 (Utah 2008). "Failure to produce acceptable evidence demonstrating
a genuine issue of material fact will result in a grant of summary judgment." Utah Local
Govt Trust v. Wheeler Mack Co., 154 P.3d 175 (Utah Ct. App. 2006).
Kreyling presented absolutely no facts or evidence in support of his allegation that the
City created a hole, or that it knew or should have known of the existence of a hole or other
defect in the park strip. Utah law is clear, "when the facts are so tenuous, vague, or
insufficiently established that determining the legal issue becomes completely speculative,
the claim fails as a matter of law." AMSSaltlnd., Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of America, 942
P.2d 315, 320 (Utah 1997). "[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence
favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. "If the evidence
is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). The district court Order
provides:
[T]he Court finds there is no probative evidence that the City of
St. George created the defect or condition in the park strip, or
knew or should have known of any defect or condition. The
court noted "I'm satisfied on the basis of this record that, as a
matter of law, under these facts one cannot stretch liability to the
City of St. George.
R.616 (Order granting summary judgment at pg. 2), Appellee's Addendum "B," R.655
11
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(Transcript of hearing at 23:13-16), Appellee's Addendum "A.*' The district court's findings
and Order Granting Summary Judgment are clearly supported by the evidence, and summary
judgment in favor of the City should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.

KREYLING FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN
HIS CLAIM THAT THE CITY IS LIABLE FOR INJURY AS THE
LANDOWNER OF THE PARK STRIP,
A.

There is No Evidence the City Created or Had Notice of a Defect.

The Utah Supreme Court recently iterated the requirements for a plaintiff to survive
summary judgment on a claim for injuries resulting from a defect located on the defendant's
premises. Goebel v. Salt Lake Southern R. Co., 104 P.3d 1185 (Utah 2004). If a plaintiff
alleges a defendant negligently failed to remedy a dangerous condition the defendant did not
create, "[i]t is quite universally held that fault cannot be imputed to the defendant so that
liability results therefrom unless two conditions are met: (A) that he had knowledge of the
condition, that is, either actual knowledge, or constructive knowledge because the condition
had existed long enough that he should have discovered it; and (B) that after such knowledge,
sufficient time elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care he should have remedied i t "
Id. (citing to Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996)). Evidence of
notice and a reasonable time to remedy are required to survive a motion for summary
judgment or directed verdict. Goebel, 104 P.3d at 1195, These requirements do not apply
where the negligence claim requires the plaintiff to establish that the defendant actually
created the dangerous condition or purposefully built the dangerous condition into the system
for which the defendant is responsible. Id. The Goeble court noted the rationale behind the
12
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distinct rules is that it is reasonable to presume a party has notice of a condition the party
itself creates, but it is not reasonable to presume notice of a condition someone else creates.
Id.
In this case, there is no evidence the City was responsible for creating a defective
condition or hole that caused Kreyling to fall or step into it. Kreyling argued at summary
judgment that the photographs taken by him confirm that "a half circle [was] cut out of the
driveway that went around something that once was there that became a hole." R.649, 505,
305; Transcript of Hearing at 17:19-20, Appellee's Addendum "A"; and photograph of
plaintiff and excavation at Appellee's Addendum "C." In his Brief, Kreyling argues that the
semi-circle was present when the driveway was poured. Appellant's Brief at 18. However,
he has presented no evidence of even when the private driveway was poured, what the object
might have been, when it was placed, when it was removed or by whom, or whether the
defect in the concrete is related in any way to a hole. Indeed, Kreyling has presented no one
to confirm the cause of his fall, or the presence of the hole he describes.
The evidence shows the County purchased the homes in this area and utilized them
for various activities prior to tearing them down. R.520-21, 562-64; Coulter Deposition at
49, 51, 52, Photographs of pre-existing homes WC005, 008-9, Appellee's Addendum "C."
Sometime in late 2002 or early 2003, the County tore the houses down, removing one of the
driveways all the way to the curb. R.335, 312-15, 318, 338, 515, 517, 520 561-64; Id. at
26:17-20, 37:3-6, 57:4-14; Photographs of pre-existing homes and excavation by County,
Appellee's Addendum "C." The County removed all shrubbery and fencing. Id. Gerald
Newton, a volunteer at the Center, testified that the County had been "digging" in the park
13
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strip, "they had done something to take the dirt out." R.494 (Newton Deposition at 18:9-21).
Further, Nolan Gardner, the City Water District Superintendent averred that neither the
County nor Watts Construction ever notified the City that they would be excavating in the
park strip. R.363. He also averred that the City did not dig in the park strip. R.364. Dennis
Jorgensen, the City Power Systems Operations Manager, averred that no power poles had
been moved or removed from the location identified by Kreyling and the pole located in the
park strip where Kreyling fell was installed in 1985 and has not be removed since that time.
R.349.
The U.S. Supreme Court stated in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.:
[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence
favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for
that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not
significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.
477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
Similarly, there is no evidence the City had "notice" of a defect. Id. "It is quite
universally held that fault cannot be imputed to the landowner so that liability results
therefrom unless two conditions are met: (A) that he had knowledge of the condition, that is,
either actual knowledge, or constructive knowledge because the condition had existed long
enough that he should have discovered it; and (B) that after such knowledge, sufficient time
elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care he should have remedied it." Goebel, 104 P.3d
at 1195. Evidence of notice and a reasonable time to remedy are required to survive a motion
for summary judgment or a directed verdict. Id.
Kreyling argues that, because there is a semi-circle in the driveway, the City must
14
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have had notice of a hole. Appellant's Brief at 18. However, in order for a jury to reach the
conclusion that a hole had existed in the park strip since the driveway was poured, it would
also have to speculate regarding when the driveway was poured, what it contained, when and
who removed the "whatever" that was in the hole and finally, that when the County
excavated in the park strip to remove the second driveway, it didn't disturb the soil around
the alleged hole. However, the appellate courts have repeatedly affirmed that where "jurors
would have to engage in rank speculation to reach a verdict, summary judgment is proper."
Triesault v. Greater Salt Lake Business Dist., 126 P.3d 781, 785 (Utah Ct. App. 2005)
(citation and quotations omitted).
The parties conducted exhaustive discovery. Summary judgment was filed only after
discovery was closed. There is absolutely no evidence the City had any knowledge that a
hole existed, much less evidence of when the hole was created. The County used and
excavated the property without notifying the City of its activities. Coulter testified the
County did not apply for either an encroachment permit or a number. The evidence shows
that Watts Construction never applied for an encroachment permit. The evidence shows the
County failed to barricade the area even during excavation of the park strip. Moreover, the
evidence makes clear Kreyling was aware of the construction activities in the area. R.481
(Kreyling Deposition at 38:9-11, 38-39:17-12, Appellant's Addendum "A"). Kreyling
testified that he did not want his wife to walk on the dirt because she was having trouble with
herlegsR.476-77,481 (Id. at21:21-25,23:18-23,41:l,),andhe knew there was alternative
parking with handicap access in the lot. R.477 (Id. at 22). Yet he elected to encounter the
potential hazard because he had parked there dozens of times in the past and had "never
15
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noticed" the hole. R.481 {Id, at 39:Vj.
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Gildea v. Guardian Title Co, of Utah, 970 P.2d 1265,1270 (Utah, 1998); Triesaultv. Greater
Salt Lake Business Dist., 126 P.3d 781, 785 (Utah Ct. App. 2005), Clark v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 893 P.2d 598, 600-01 (Utah Ct.App. 1995) (quotations omitted). A plaintiff may not
rely on inference as to whether the defendant had notice of a defect and adequate time to
remedy the situation, he must present specific probative evidence of the defect, that it caused
the injury and the length of time it was present. Fishbaugh v. UP&L, 969 P.2d 403, 408
(Utah 1998). The plaintiffs mere hypothesis that a defect may have existed for some
unknown length of time does not suffice and summary judgment is appropriate. Id., Goebel,
104P.3datll94.
B.

The City Had No Duty to Kreyling Under the "Special Use'5 Doctrine.

All changes and excavation in the area were undertaken or caused by the abutting
landowner, Washington County. However, ordinarily liability will not be imposed on the
owner of property abutting an unsafe street or sidewalk, but such liability may be imposed
under the "special use" doctrine. Rose v. Provo City, 67 P.3d 1017, 1021 (Utah Ct. App.
2003).
Kreyling testified that the driveway ramps were intended for use by the senior citizens
visiting the County owned Senior Center. R. 476-81; Appellant's Addendum A: Kreyling
Deposition at 18:19-25, 19:1-2, 20, 21:18-20, 23:15-23, 25:16-20, 26:1-2, 27:21, 32:7-9,
36:10,39:4-23. He testified that there were one or two of these walkways bridging the gutter
and he would always try to park near one when he visited the Center with his wife. R.346,
and photographs of site at Appellee's Addendum "C." County employees testified that they
knew the patrons were parking on the street near the construction even though parking was
17
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available in the lot. R.494 (Newton Deposition at 2o~22 L R 4^0, 47". It is apparent the
driveway ramps were being used for a "special 01 umueiuk. , : - ;•• - , despite alternative
available paiknii;
Kreyling argues the "special use" doctrine does not diminish the City's duty to prevent
his fall, or discover the hole next to the driveway in the park

; . •. .->i:
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• * i.er testified that he called the city and told
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them about the hazard and his use of the asphalted park strip as a driveway. Thus, due to the
evidence produced by the plaintiff, the court found there was a genuine issue as to whether
the city knew or should have known of the hazard it had created. See Goebel, 104 P.3d at
1995.
In this case, there is no evidence the City created any hazard. On the contrary the
evidence supports the fact that the Senior Center invited its patrons to use the driveway
"ramp" to access the Center and there is no evidence the City was ever advised of this use;
the evidence also confirms that the County never advised the City of any construction or
"digging" in the park strip to remove or alter the driveways, nor is there evidence the City
should have been aware of the excavation in the park strip. R.326, 493-95, Newton
Deposition at 15,20-22; R.310,320,513-14,526, Coulter Deposition at 19,20-21,25,62-65.
Witness testimony confirms that persons who frequented the area on a daily basis saw no
defect, no hole, "nothing out of the ordinary" prior to Kreyling's fall. Id.\ R.511-12 (Coulter
Deposition at 11-12:12-9,13:15-20,14:1-8,17:5-11; R.492,494, Newton Deposition at 1213:21-2, 18:9-21; R.354, 357, 550, 554, DeMille Deposition at 16-17, 32:17-20. The
evidence also establishes that the County used the property for law enforcement exercises,
inserted and removed poles, fences and shrubbery from the area. R.562, Appellee's
Addendum "C," Photographs. Finally, the evidence shows the County failed to erect any
barricades to protect the public from the construction and/or excavation. See St. George City
Code § 7-1-3 (encroachment permit required to erect or repair any building abutting public
property); St. George City Code § 7-1-12 (permit required to excavate or construct a
sidewalk, or alter a sidewalk); St. George City Code § 7-2-1 (permit required to excavate any
19
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street, allc\ <v- public riaeej, St. George City Code § 7-2-7 (bairiei and warning devices are
required for anyone cutting or making an excavation in or upon n\.: . • •
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Kreyling Knew of Alternative Available Parking Away from.. Construction

"It is wel; - ulcii li. a i. pias.:..!; A'I )•;• Hi -i.;..M.,i
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to foresee a dar»< m ? v. nticularly one that is plainly visible and avoid, it. Deals \ \ Commercial
Security Bank 74o P.2d * 1°1, 1104 fTTtah Ct. Apr. 198^

Kre\img admits that he was

aware of the consiiu,., ••-• : • • - • •

; A* ] (Kreyling Deposition

•••

•• :^"

at - ^ ^ - O ^ ' H -•). ^8:24-25,31-32,39:1,52:11-10, v : 2 4 . 132:12-1^). Indeed he testified
that an unidentified construction worker assisted him to hi.
testiiiwC

.::••••

••• • '^ -.' > * ' t]20

; ; . . - . d. at 28:0 1 I 11

am; aid because, although he was
-L.o.UuJ

aware of the nearby construction activities, there was no fence or barricade where he parked.
R.477, 479, 481, Id. at 22-23,32,41. He also knew that he had the option of parking in the
Senior Center parking lot or even the nearby church parking lot with handicap access for his
wife. R. 477, Id. at 22-23,132. If a plaintiff fails to see, or sees but fails to avoid the danger,
then the plaintiff acted negligently. Id., see Pollesche v. K-Mart Enterprises of Utah, Inc.,
520P.12d200,203 (Utah 1974); Whitman v. W.T. Grant Co., 395 P.2d 918,920 (Utah 1964)
(plaintiff can be negligent either in failing to look or in failing to heed what he saw).
II.

KREYLING'S CLAIM THAT THE CITY'S INADEQUATE OR FAILED
INSPECTION OF A PRIVATE DRIVEWAY AND/OR THE COUNTY'S
CONSTRUCTION PROJECT CAUSED HIS INJURY IS BARRED BY
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY.
Under the Governmental Immunity Act in the fall of 2003, immunity was waived unless the

injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from a latent dangerous or latent defective
condition of any road, street, sidewalk, or other structure located on them. Utah Code Ann. § 63-3010(16)(2001)1. A "latent defect" is a defect which reasonably careful inspection will not reveal.
Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 105, 107 (Utah 1978). Injuries resulting from latent defects
in a street not due to faulty municipal work, and which could not have been discovered by ordinary
care and diligence, do not give a right of action against the municipal corporation in the absence of
actual or constructive notice. Id. at 105. Kreyling argues that the City should have known about the
hole, if it had inspected the private driveway when it was poured, or inspected the County's
construction project for compliance with the City's building and safety ordinances.
However, Kreyling has presented no evidence to suggest that the "hole" of which he
complains was even present prior to when he stepped on the site, or whether it was possible to

^ h e Governmental Immunity Act version applicable at the time of Plaintiff s accident.
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discover the hole upon any inspection. Indeed, Kreyling himself testified that he had parked in this
same ioLahoi, " JO/LT.
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A ^ .• A i-olc, nor did he see

ahole on the date of the accident. R.480-82; Kreyling Deposition 35:15-16,38:10-14, 39:4-9,40:80
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after the incident. R.492; NewtonDeposition m • : i \ line Watts, of Watts Construction, saw no
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- ;.».%>:! i. Constr uction, saw "nothing oi it of the
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semi-circle. The extension of this argument is that the semi-circle, located in the comer of the park
strip between the edge of the gutter and the driveway ran i p, is l he lot alion and'oi "cause1* oi'the hole,
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th 1.- •!•/* A: No, no, I don't know." R.512, Coulter Deposition at .' 5:4-24). 1 le also argues the City
"should have known" theCounty andits contractors wen- o,;mai. i ^ ii:--, ; ,;-
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C *=•: >.'•-• N failure to notify the City of its encroachment, if it had properly inspected the site and the
County's excavation work.
T> - • -" •;: uients clearly raise the issue of the City' s immunity pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
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§ 63-30-10(4), for failure to make an inspection or for making an inadequate inspection. Kreyling
suggests that, had the City inspected the County's construction project and, some many years ago,
inspected the construction of the private driveway, it would have been aware that the County or the
homeowner had created a defect in the park strip. However, such an inspection would be intended
to assure compliance with the various building and other safety codes, as well as City ordinances.
Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265, 270 (Utah 1995). Such a failure to inspect or
inadequate inspection is strictly protected from liability by the Governmental Immunity Act. "We
thus conclude that the immunity granted in section [63-30-10(4)] was intended to immunize the
conclusions and results of an inspection where the inspector may have overlooked something..."
Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d 995, 998 (Utah 1993).
Kreyling argues that Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126 (Utah 1987) supports the
conclusion that summary judgment was improper. However, in Ingram^ summary judgment was
denied because the plaintiff presented evidence that created a genuine issue of fact. The plaintiff
claimed he was injured when he stepped on a manhole cover that collapsed under his weight. The
plaintiff claimed the city was negligent for failing to discover the defective manhole cover. Each
party submitted affidavits from expert witnesses regarding whether or not the defect in the manhole
cover was discoverable upon reasonable inspection. Id. at 127-28. In this case, the Plaintiff has
presented no evidence that would raise such an issue of fact. Kreyling has presented no evidence
that the hole was discoverable, or even present prior to his fall.
"[I]t is well settled that the court may not permit a jury to speculate upon the evidence and
a finding of fact cannot be based upon surmise, conjecture, guess or speculation." Olsen v.
Warwood, 255 P.2d 725 (Utah 1953); "To defeat a motion for summary judgment, evidence,
including testimony, must be based on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or surmise.' "
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' =•.-' rkina v. J e w / ? Community Center (JCC), 179 Fed.Appx. 454, 455-56 (10th Cir. 2006). Thus
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its prominence in location and other factors bearing on what could reasonably be expected of j
person charged with the duty nf supervising miles of ^tieeu anu -oe^ a
(in

..

;

• ;. 1 uth 1947). It is apparent there is no evidence to support the factua

conjecture argued by Mr. Kreyling and summary judgment was proper.
CONCLI'SJMA

Based on the foregoing, Defendant ("in of St. George respectfully requests ti.ai u;i<
Court affirm the district court's Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Si immary Judgment
DATED t h i s ^ / i a y of May 2003.
W I N D E R S ( OUNSKL, l\< ,

By:

^~——^^

ClSi^jffy

B. HUTTON

Attorney for Defendant/ L\ ppe!!=- •
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CERTIFICA I,.E 0"¥ SER\ ICE
Appellee/Defendant City o: M George certifies on this rfl

day of May 2008, that

a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE was sent by the method
unliiMlird bt'lnw In tin folliMvtmt

Brian L. Olson
Gallian, Wilcox, Welker & Olson, PC
965 E. 700 S., #305
St. George, UT 84790

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
() Facsimile

Y4/i/^

~Z^'
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APPELLEE'S ADDENDUM

Il mi: i tinscript of Hearing at Summary Judgment
Order Granting Drf -

*

4
for Summary Judpmo

Photographs
Photographs of excavation, R. 304
Photograph of construction, R.346
Photograph of construction and removed driveway, R. JO !
Photograph of pre-existing homes and SWAT activities, R. 562
Photograph of pre-existing homes taken 2-7-2002
Photograph of pre-existing home showing driveways, fencing, poles, shrubs
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ADDENDUM "A

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JULE KREYLING,
Plaintiff,

)

VS

CASE NO. 050501129

CITY OF ST . GEORGE.
Defendant.

)
)

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES L. SHUMATE
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT
220 NORTH 200 EAST
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SEPTEMBER 4, 2007

TRANSCRIBED BY: Russel D. Morgan

APPEARANCES
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
BRIAN L. OLSON
GALLIAN, WILCOX, WELKER
& OLSON
59 S. 100 E.
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770
FOR THE DEFENDANT:
LINETTE B. HUTTON
WINDER & HASLEM
175 WEST 200 SOUTH, #4000
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110-2668

September 4, 2007.

St. George, Utah.
PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT:

11 o'clock in the morning.

Matter that

we have before us is Kreyling vs. City of St. George.

And,

Mr. Olson, you are here in behalf of the plaintiff in this
6
7
8
9

case.
And, Miss Hutton, you are here in behalf of the city.
Is that correct, counsel?
MS. HUTTON:
THE COURT:

10

That's correct, Your Honor.
All right.

Now, counsel, we have before

11

us a motion for summary judgment filed by the city that

12

not going to mince words on it, counsel.

13

kind of a case and this kind of a motion when it looks like

14

we might come up to a jury issue.

15

an idea of why it is that you think that this should never

16

get to a jury from the city's standpoint.

17

counsel?

18

MS. HUTTON:

I'm

I worry about this

And I want you to give me

Why shouldn't it,

Well, factually and legally speaking,

19

there is absolutely no evidence that the city was aware of,

20

was involved in any construction or excavation at the county

21

senior center.

22

landowner liability, under the special use doctrine, the

23

party, the governmental entity has to either have created the

24

defect or they have to have been aware of it, made aware of

25

it either by the nature that it had been there for so long

Under the governmental immunity act, under

that they should have been aware of it as a property owner.
But that has never been established.

In fact, the evidence

is to the contrary, that the city was not made aware.

There

was never any encroachment permit obtained by any of the
contractors, including the county, that were involved in this
construction project.
THE COURT:

Counsel, that encroachment permit

concept, as I understand it, if I T m going to dig a hole
anywhere that's going to impact a paved city street of the
City of St. George, I'm in violation of law if I don't have a
permit

—
MS. HUTTON:
THE COURT:
MS. HUTTON:
THE COURT:

That's right.
—

to open that street.
That's correct.

And, without that permit, it's pretty

darn hard to show that the city had any knowledge of this at
all.
MS. HUTTON:

That's correct.

encroachment permit —

And the only

everyone who testified, Bob Coulter

from the county, Curtis DeMille for DeMille Construction,
Eric Watts for Watts Construction, they all testified that
they have done construction digging in that area.

Now, I'm

not saying there is any evidence that it was in a specific
area where the alleged hole is, because no one really knows
for sure.

But they all testified that nobody got an

4

encroachment permit.
Now, Curtis DeMille produced very recently an
encroachment permit for trenching in the road to put in an
8-inch water main for fire prevention.
November 18th of 2003.

That was done

But that was well after the alleged

period of time.
THE COURT:

Separate and apart from this plaintiff's

injuries.
MS, HUTTON:

Exactly.

There was no permit.

They all

testified that they have responsibility to remove water
meters.

The meter setters remove and count water lines,

sewer lines.

But no one obtained an encroachment permit.

And the defect is not even clearly defined.

We are not

really sure where it was, what caused it, how it occurred.
There is no question from the photographs that were provided
by the county that sometimes when they began their
construction and removed those four homes for purposes of
construction that they also -- there's a telephone pole that
everyone draws your attention to.
telephone pole, were driveways.
private residence.

On either side of this
One driveway went into a

The other driveway went in behind the

senior center.
At the time the county began their construction, Bob
Coulter, who is the building superintendent for the county,
he testified that those driveways were excavated by the

5

1

county back to the sidewalk.

2

driveway that the plaintiff was actually standing on, and he

31

took photographs of, that was excavated back to the sidewalk.

4|

But the one on the other side of the telephone pole, which is

5

directly in this area that the plaintiffs been complaining

61

about, was excavated all the way to the curb.

7I

see it in the photographs.

8I
9

Photographs confirm that the

And you can

I actually sent you some additional photographs that
are a lot more

—

10 I

THE COURT:

11

-MS. HUTTON:

I have them right here, counsel.
-- a lot more legible.

I was concerned

12I

about how well the other ones would show you what was

13 1

actually occurring.

14 1

there marked Washington County 008, Washington County 009.

15 1

Those show those driveways in place, one on either side of

16 1

the telephone pole.

17 1

THE COURT:

18 1

MS. HUTTON:

19 1

The first —

They were —

there's a photograph in

can you see that?

Got it.

Okay.

If you go to the next one down,

which is marked 0007, the bottom photograph

20I

THE COURT:

21 I

MS. HUTTON:

Right.

-- you can see that the sidewalk is gone

22 1

between —

23I

has been excavated all the way to the curb.

24I
25I

—

I mean, not sidewalk, the driveway.

THE COURT:

The driveway

In fact, it appears that the only thing

remaining of that driveway surface is the actual culvert top,

if you want to call it that, from the blacktop to the top of
the curb.
MS.
is left.

HUTTON:

Exactly.

The gutter.

That's all that

So, clearly, with respect to all three of the

theories of immunity that the city has asserted, in order to
establish that we were not immune, the plaintiff would have
to establish that we in some way had some knowledge of this
defect which can not be established.

In fact, Mr. Kreyling

testified that he parked in this same area from two to as
many as four times a week.

During that time —

well, what

his statement was, "I parked there dozens of times and never
noticed a hole.

It looked like solid dirt."

Bob Coulter testified that he saw it after he heard
someone had fallen there.

He f s not sure of the time period,

because even the plaintiff ! s a little faulty about when he
actually fell.

Bob Coulter testified there was no hole.

was just a dished out area.

It

Gerald Newton, who is a

volunteer for the senior center and who was at the senior
center five days a week, he testified that it was just a
rough dirt area with lots of leaves everywhere.
Curtis DeMille, who is the president of DeMille
Construction, he testified that he looked at the area, and
there was nothing out of the ordinary.
In the plaintiff's responses to interrogatories, the
plaintiff states —

well, actually, in response to the city's

7

l!

statement of facts, at paragraph 12 he admits, in responding to

21

the city's motion for summary judgment, that he saw this area

3I

as many as four times a week and never noticed a hole.

41

there's no way that the city could have been aware unless they

51

were made aware.

61

week were unaware of it without the encroachment permit, there

7J

is no way that the city would have any idea that anything had

81

happened to the park strip.

If people who were there four or five times a

THE COURT:

91

So,

Well, counsel, I guess my real concern

10 I

is, if I look at your photograph sheet that you have supplied

11 I

me, the lower right hand designation you put on it is Exhibit

12 I

B, and quote, close quote, reply, I see$ the cones around

13 1

this hole and ground.

14 1

of art that described this particular critter -- but it's one

15 I

of those

And I see —

there's probably a term

—

16

MS.

HUTTON:

17 I

THE COURT:

Divot?
—

one of those delineator markers with a

18 1

heavy bottom on it that has toppled over into the hole.

19 1

the hole, if I've got the scale right, looking at the

20I

infamous telephone pole as well as the person who is standing

21 I

next to it at the top

22

MS.

HUTTON:

23

THE COURT:

And

—
Um-hmm, yes.

—

that hole appears to be, I would say

24 I

18 to 20 inches deep.

It's just your position that no

25 I

encroachment permit, no other statement of any kind in any

record, any place, gave the city notice that there was that
hole next to that street in that location by the telephone
pole?
MS. HUTTON:

That's correct.

Also, what you are

seeing in those photographs -- those are the photographs that
the plaintiff took.

Those photographs are after the sidewalk

and curb and everything was removed.
THE COURT:

MS. HUTTON:

Right.

We don't have any idea really what it

looked like at the time that the plaintiff alleged he was
there.
THE COURT:

(Inaudible.)

MS. HUTTON:

Now, there is testimony that the dished

out area that Mr. Coulter looked at was about nine inches
deep.
THE COURT:

Okay.

So, this excavation that we have

here is after the fact.
MS.

HUTTON:

THE COURT:

Um-hmm.

By —

has anybody been able to establish

how far after the fact, how many days or weeks after the
fact?
MS. HUTTON:

Well, according to the most recent

production that was made by DeMille —
couple weeks ago —
transcript.

and I just got this a

they have made a change in his deposition

And he states in his deposition where he's made

9

these changes that the sidewalk was removed on November 19th.
Now, that would mean that that photograph that you are
holding was taken sometime after November 19th.

But I have

no way to confirm or deny that other than this statement that
was made by Mr. DeMille that the sidewalk wasn't removed
until -THE COURT:
MS. HUTTON:

Mr. Kreyling's injury was in

—

He states, well, sometime between

September 3rd and September 10th.
THE COURT:

Okay.

So, this would have been at least

30 and maybe as many as 40 days after?
MS. HUTTON:

And he does testify in his deposition

he being Mr. Kreyling, that he took the photographs two or
three weeks later.

So, we know it's after November 19th.

That looks like a pretty nice day for it to be November 19th,
almost Thanksgiving, but -THE COURT:

Well, in St. George all

(inaudible),

counsel.
MS.

HUTTON:

THE COURT:

Yeah.

Well, counsel, I guess you know what my

real problem always is going to be whenever you are asking a
trial judge for summary

judgment

I 'm aLlways of a mind that

summary judgment is a lovely way to get (inaudible) , but it's
a great way to g et reversed.

You are confident that based

upon the record that you've got and all the discover y that

10

you have been through, that the grounds that you have; that
is, no encroachment permit, no notice, no proof of any notice
that the St. George City's immunity simply is established?
MS. HUTTON:

That's correct.

And also, I want to

point out that the supreme court of the Utah State in
Gullible

[phonetic] vs. Salt Lake Southern Railroad, citing

to Schnop House vs. Storehouse, it's one of those slip and
falls, 2004.

"It's usually held that fault can not be

imputed to the defendant unless the plaintiff demonstrates,
one, that the defendant had knowledge of the condition; and,
two, that after such knowledge sufficient time had elapsed
that in the exercise of reasonable care he should have
remedied it."
THE COURT:

It's the old law school example of green

bean slip and fall in a grocery store case.
MS. HUTTON:

Exactly.

But they go on to cite to

Deets vs. Commercial Security Bank, which —

stating that

—

and that's a case where the plaintiff slipped and fell on the
employer's icy parking terrace.

And the courts said that the

plaintiff testified in her deposition that she knew that
there was ice on the terrace.

And she also knew that there

was alternative parking available.

Therefore, fault could

not be imputed to the employer because she didn't have to
walk across the icy parking lot.
The same can be argued here regardless of whether

it's the city or one of the construction companies.

The

plaintiff testified that he was -- I mean, he was aware of
the construction.

He had been parking there.

He just

assumed that it was okay, because there were no cones, there
was no fence.

There was no barricade, which is also required

by ordinance to be put up.

And because of that, although he

knew there was construction there, he didn't think that it
was unsafe.

He also testified that he knew that there was

alternative parking.

But he particularly liked this place

because of the driveway ramp that made it easier for him to
get his wife across the gutter and onto the sidewalk.

So,

the county was inviting its citizens to utilize this ramp in
a manner that actually exposed them to this construction
site.

And without even putting up a barricade.
THE COURT:

And, counsel, concomitant with the

encroachment permit is the hole barricade warning system set
up within the county ordinance, mandating, if you are going
to cut our streets and put holes in them, you have to let the
public know.
MS.

HUTTON:

That's correct.

In fact, the ordinance

says that if the barricade has to be in place until that area
is restored to its previous or similar to previous condition.
So, there should have been something there to -THE COURT:

Mess with our grade, you better barricade

it until it's back to the way it was.

12

MS.

HUTTON:

Exactly.

And Bob Coulter testified that

the reason they didn't do that was because it was
particularly inconvenient when they were moving big trucks
back and forth out of the site with this debris and other
materials.

And, you know, I understand that's always one of

the construction problems.

But they had an active facility

right next door that was parking increasingly close to this
construction site.

In fact, you can tell from the

photographs they couldn't have gotten much closer from using
this particular ramp.

Which also brings up the theory of the

special use doctrine.

The plaintiff argued against special

use because the case that Rose vs. Provo City basically said
that the liability of the private property owner using the
park strip for a special purpose did not automatically make
the city immune because they still had knowledge of this, if
they had knowledge or had created the same issue that comes
up in the latent defect argument.

The difference between

Rose and our case is that in Rose, Provo City had actually
dug up the park strip themselves.

In fact, they had dug up

the park strip on at least two occasions to replace a pipe,
some kind of a drainage pipe.

Rose, or the property owner

that was also involved in the case, he had called, he had
documentation that he had called the city and recorded his
special use.

And he had called and reported that they had

made it hazardous by digging it up.

So, he could establish

13

1I

that the city had the awareness that can not be established

21

here.

31

no evidence that the city created this hazard.

4J

evidence the county was aware of this special use that was

51

being made of these driveways.

So, for the special use doctrine, there is —

THE COURT:

6I

Okay.

there is

But there is

Mr. Olson, if I rule in favor of

7I

the city, what are you going to tell the court of appeals

8I

that I have erred on?
MR. OLSON:

91

Well, I think the first thing I would

10 1

like to do for you, Your Honor, is to make sure we do have

111

the facts a little bit straight.

12 1

pictures, one of which depicts my client pointing at the

13I

ground.

14 1

that sort of thing.

15 J

pictures were taken several weeks after the fall and after

16I

excavation.

17I

those pictures.

18 1

excavation wasn't there.

19 1

looks like a 8, 9-inch dip there, that's not really the

20 1

issue.

211

takes place is the nature of this hole.

22 1

testimony is that he stepped into a cylindrical hole that fit

23

his entire leg, and he was still not touching bottom.

24

went into his groin, not touching bottom.

25I

forth undisputed facts that says it was a depression.

You are looking at the

That's the pictures that shows the excavation and
And I think it's understood that those

So, you know, the excavation is apparent in
Although, it's the same area, that
So, when the court says, hey, that

In fact, that's where our biggest dispute of fact
My client's

He

The city's put
It was

1]

a nine-inch hole.

2I

wasn't.

31

It was this and that.

No, it clearly

Mr. Kreyling's deposition is, I stepped into that

41

thing up to my groin.

51

course, (inaudible) at the city, if you look at my client's

61

picture, he doesn't have much of an inseam but, nonetheless,

71

it was much more than nine inches.
THE COURT:

81
9J

And I wasn't touching bottom.

Neither do I, counsel.

Of

I'll give the

city that break.
MR. OLSON:

10 J

So, I think it is important that there is

11 I

that dispute of fact from the nature of the hole from the

12I

get-go.

13 1

Now, looking at this thing, one thing the city really

14 1

hasn't argued today that it certainly argued in the motion, is

15 1

that there are city ordinances that require abutting property

16 1

owner to keep property in good condition.

17 I

with that city ordinance is that there is also significant case

18I

law that says the entity has a non-delegable duty to maintain

19 1

the streets and sidewalks.

20I

THE COURT:

Well, the problem

That's Ingram vs. Salt Lake City.

But, counsel, if I were the owner of a

21

backhoe, sometimes I wish I was, but I'm not, and I went to

22 1

the city street in front of my old house, which was in St.

23 1

George, my new house is in Ivins.

24

house and just decided to dig into the street out there

25

because I didn't like the way my water line seemed to be

But if I went to my old

leaking, if I don't file a permit request and be granted that
encroachment permit, how is the city going to know that I
have put a hole in their street until one of their squad cars
drops in it or one of their garbage trucks falls in it and
they get a call from the garbage contractor that says you
have hole in front of this house?

How is the city going to

know?
MR. OLSON:
saying.

Sure.

And I understand what you are

I think the first thing to understand is that it's

not a standard action notice.
should have known.

It f s a standard or knew or

So that the lack of encroachment permit

in itself doesn't say, hey, latent defect.

They don't get to

stand up and say, hey, we didn't know anything about it.
There wasn't an encroachment permit.

Using your example,

let's say the city rise by that hole in the street, through
its officers, agents, whoever it may be for five months and
says no encroachment permit.
not the way it works.

We are not liable.

That's just

It's a knew or should have known

standard.
THE COURT:

Counsel, let's look at the factual basis

around your client's injury, of the should have known side of
it.

It's your client's position that, certainly, when he

took the photographs that are in the record now, what we have
been looking at, on or about the 19th of November at the
earliest day, that, certainly, anybody driving by that should

16

1

have known.

2

there was a hole there.

3

injury, somewhere in the range of mid-September, let's say.

4

What facts can you point me to that are in the record that

5

support that "should have known" that make me want to give

6J

this to a jury and let them make that decision?

7J

And the city should have known by that time that

MR. OLSON:

But let's go back to the time of the

Sure, Your Honor.

And, of course, I

8I

think one of the things that is important to understand,

9J

there are not indicators that this hole was created at the

10I

time the county began its construction on the senior center.

Ill

In fact, there is not a lot of indicators as to when this

12 1

hole was created but for the fact that we have a driveway

13 J

that was poured going into what was an old LDS Church and

14 J

then was owned by the county and used as a senior center,

15 1

presumably a driveway, I'm making assumptions, was there when

16 1

the church went in.

17 I

But if you look at the pictures that contain my client and

18 1

what he's pointing to, you see a half circle cut out of the

19 1

driveway that went around something that once was there that

20

became a hole.

21

the discoloration of dirt, my client's testimony is that's

22

where the hole was.

23

was encroachment permit or otherwise, there is a driveway

24 I

poured across the city's property going around an object that

25

at least came up to the ground in order for concrete to form

It goes through the back parking lot.

In fact, if we look at that half circle and

So, at some point in time, whether there

around it.

And, at some point in time, that object was

removed.
Now, we have the double-edged sword of they say,
well, it's latent because when plaintiff, you know, walked
into it he didn't see it.
was covered with leaves.

It was covered with cobwebs.

It

It was covered with this and that.

You know, obviously, if he saw it he wouldn't have stepped
into it.

But it goes back to the old law school case you are

referring of, the typical case of a slip in a grocery store.
I always refer to it as the banana peel case.

And you look

at it and say, how brown was the banana peel?

That's how we

know how long it was sitting there.
THE COURT:

Or whether or not it got into the

petrified stage.
MR. OLSON:

Exactly.

Exactly.

So, we have a hole

that's been there long enough for leaves and cobwebs and that
sort of thing to form.we've got a driveway that has been
there for a very long time that was poured around something
that was there.

But you are right, we are not terribly sure

what was pulled out to cause that hole.
was a deep cylindrical hole.

What we do know, it

And it was very close to a

walking area.
So, I think what's important for the court to ask
itself, and I think that the court had it well under hand when
you first looked at it.

The biggest hurdle in this case is the

18

city is asking for summary judgment on what is, essentially, a
standard of reasonableness.

And if we look at the definition

of latent defect, and that's what's required to get the
immunity, it's one in which reasonable care upon full
inspection would not reveal.
inspection.

It's reasonable care upon

So, it's a question of reasonableness or question

of negligence.
If we look at the —
Club vs. Sanpete County.

there's a case called Pig's Gun

It says, "Determination of latent.

The definition of "latent" is for a finder of fact."
get —

the other case was Bowen vs. Riverton City.

We will
"Summary

judgments are more frequently given in contract cases.
However, when it comes to determining negligence,
contributory negligence and causation, courts are not in such
a good position to make a total determination, for here
enters a prerogative of the jury to make a determination of
its own.

And that is, did the conduct of a party measure up

to that of a reasonably prudent man and, if not, was it a
proximate cause of the harm done?"
If we look at the Ingram vs. Salt Lake City case, that
was a manhole case where someone, you know, fell into something
that was either a defective lid or open or something like that.
It state's, "What constitutes a defective, unsafe or dangerous
condition of a parkway where a latent defect of a water meter
lid presents a question of fact that is properly answered by a

19

jury."
So, we are really left with a situation, Your Honor,
where you are going to have to make a judgment call if you
rule today, that this defect would not have been found upon
reasonable inspection.
That's the judgment that would have to be made today.
And I would assert to you, number one, that we've got a big
dispute of fact as to what the nature of this hole was in the
first place.

That, yet, to take the next step and determine

would it have been discovered upon reasonable inspection.
THE COURT:

Well, counsel, are we going to call the

directors of the streets departments from Washington City,
Santa Clara City, Ivins City, St. George City, Hurricane City
and have them all come in and testify as to how they inspect
their streets to determine whether or not St. George City was
reasonable in its treatment of this location where the injury
occurred?
MR. OLSON:

I guess what I would assert to that, Your

Honor, is it's not a question of how much inspection is
reasonable.

It's a question of -- or even what kind of

inspection is reasonable.

Rather, it ! s a question on if they

reasonably inspected the property, would they have noticed?
So, it's not a question of, well, they had a duty to come out
and inspect their streets and sidewalks every other day.
That's really not the issue.

The issue is, if they had given

20

1

it a reasonable inspection, would they have noticed it?

2

that goes to a question of the reasonable man viewing this

3

property, would you have noticed the defect upon a reasonable

4

inspection.
THE COURT:

51
6I

Counsel, you are the moving party.

And

You

do get last say.
MS. HUTTON:

71

Thank you, Your Honor.

Well, in

8J

response to that, I would have to remind the court that all

9

of the evidence, and we are talking about testimony after the

10I

fact, 20/20 hindsight, all of these witnesses said even

11I

knowing that someone had fallen, we didn't see a hole.

12I

Mr. Kreyling himself parked there every day.

He made

13]

a better inspection than the city is going to do.

14I

absent going around sticking a pole in the ground throughout

15 1

St. George City, we are not going to know what's going to

16 J

cave in.

17 1

We don't know what this hole looked like before.
Now, the photographs, the photographs in hj*re, they

18 J

show this property.

19

The photograph was taken February 2002 —

20 1

You can see the telephone pole.

21

WC008.

22
23 1
24
25

I mean,

THE COURT:

And the photographs are actually dated.
February 7th, 2002.

That's the one that's marked

And there is no indication of any round

object being placed inside the hole there.
MS. HUTTON:

There is nothing there.

Plus, this

location that is being pointed to is right at the seam of the

II

curb and the driveway.

2

Other than the possibility now, you know, for a possibility,

3I

the county, apparently, did use this property.

4J

this, these photographs where the County Sheriff's Office is

5

using this property for some type of maneuvers.

61

what they are.

71

not in order to do that, if that's WC005, whether or not

8I

do you have that there?

And they have barricaded this.

91

THE COURT:

10 J

MS. HUTTON:

111

know —

13 I

And there's

I don't know
Whether or
—

Let me take a look at what you've got.
T h e fact o f t h e m a t t e r i s , w e just

don't

he definitely has this picture.
THE COURT:

12 J

I mean right in the corner there.

Oh, that's just a SWAT team working out,

counsel.

14 1

MS. HUTTON:

15 J

THE COURT:

16 J

MS. HUTTON:

Well, yeah.
We have seen a lot of them.
And they have put in some post and

17 J

drapes, some crime scene tape there.

18 J

occurred before the construction occurred because the houses

19 I

are t h e r e .

201

And we know that that

"The U n i t e d States Supreme Court h a s h e l d on

several

J

21

o c c a s i o n s that t h e n o n - m o v e m e n t

22 I

evidence in support of his claim that creates a genuine issue

23

for t r i a l .

24I

to t h e n o n m o v a n t ,

25 1

merely colorable

V i e w i n g the evidence

—

nonmovant must

produce

in the light m o s t

favorable

it is not enough that the e v i d e n c e
or anything short of s i g n i f i c a n t l y

is
probative

1

to defeat summary judgment."

That's Anderson vs. Liberty

2

Lobby.

3I

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

"This is because when the record taken as a whole

nonmoving party there is no genuine issue.

Once the movant

points out an absence of proof on essential element of the
6I

nonmovant's case, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to

71

provide evidence to the contrary."

81
9I

That just can not be done here.

There is no evidence

that the City of St. George created a hole there.

And there

10

is no evidence that they knew or should have known that there

11]

was any defect in this park strip.

12 1

summary judgment be granted on behalf of the city.
THE COURT:

131

And I would request that

Your motion is granted, counsel.

I'm

14 I

just satisfied on the basis of this record that as a matter

15 1

of law under these facts one can not stretch liability to the

16

City of St. George.

17 1

If you'll prepare an order to that effect, circulate

18 1

it under the rules, and I'll sign it when I get it.

19 1

you, counsel.

20 I

back.

21
22!
23
24
25

Thank

And I'm going to give you your courtesy copies

Do I get recycling credit?
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9

UTAH, RESIDING AT WASHINGTON COUNTY, UTAH;
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11
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12
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13

TYPEWRITING, AND THAT A TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION

14
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15
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ADDENDUM "B

Linette B. Hutton (#6408)
Dennis Flynn (#10399)
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
P.O. Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222
Facsimile (801) 322-2282
Attorneys for Defendant City of St. George
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, WASHINGTON COUNTY

JULE W. KREYLING,
Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT ST.
GEORGE CITY'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

CITY OF ST. GEORGE, et at,
Defendants.

Case No. 050501129
Judge James L. Shumate

RICHARD WATTS CONSTRUCTION,
INC., d/b/a WATTS CONSTRUCTION
CO., INC., a Utah Corporation
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
CURTIS DEMILLE CONSTRUCTION,
INC., a Utah Corporation
Third-Party Defendant.

The above entitled matter came before the Court on September 4,2007 on Defendant City of St.
George's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Plaintiff was represented by Brian L. Olson of Gallian,
4233 003

Wilcox, Welker & Olson and Defendant City of St. George by Linette B. Hutton, of Winder & Haslam.
Following oral argument from counsel, the Court's examination of the pleadings and being fully advised
in the premises, the Court finds there is no probative evidence that the City of St. George created the
defect or condition in the park strip, or knew or should have known of any defect or condition. Therefore,
the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant City of St. George's Motion for Summary Judgment.
DATED this 7

day of SepSsSer 2007.
BY THE COURT

Honorable JAMES L. SHUMATE
Judge, Fifth Judicial District Court
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